Breyer v. Meissner by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-6-2000 
Breyer v. Meissner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Breyer v. Meissner" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 122. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/122 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed June 6, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-1842 
 
JOHANN BREYER, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DORIS MEISSNER, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-06515) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr. 
 
Argued: April 27, 1999 
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and MCKAY1, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 6, 2000) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1. Honorable Monroe G. McKay, Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       Willan F. Joseph, Esquire (Argued) 
       1831 Chestnut Street, Suite 1001 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
       David W. Ogden Acting 
        Assistant Attorney General 
       Civil Division 
       Karen F. Torstenson 
       Assistant Director 
       Gretchen M. Wolfinger, Esquire 
        (Argued) 
       United States Department of Justice 
       Office of Immigration Litigation 
       P.O. Box 878 
       Ben Franklin Station 
       Washington, DC 20044 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves the interpretation of our immigration 
laws as they apply to Johann Breyer, a naturalized citizen 
who claimed, when faced with denaturalization, that he had 
been entitled to American citizenship by birth through his 
American-born mother. The statutes governing Breyer's 
claim to citizenship are S 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 
1874 and a 1994 amendment to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act ("INA"), S 101(c)(2) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act ("INTCA"). In our 
review, we consider whether these provisions discriminated 
against Breyer's mother on the basis of gender, in violation 
of the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution. Because we find that they did 
discriminate against the mother, we must then determine 
what effect Breyer's subsequent actions during World War 
II had on his claim to American citizenship. 
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I. Factual Background 
 
Johann Breyer was born in Czechoslovakia on May 30, 
1925, to an American mother and a foreign father. 2 As a 
young man, Breyer joined the Waffen SS, a Nazi 
paramilitary group, and ultimately became a member of the 
SS Totenkopfsturmbanne (Death's Head Battalion). As a 
member of the Death's Head Battalion, Breyer guarded 
concentration camps where inmates were enslaved, 
tortured, and executed because of race, religion, national 
origin, or political beliefs. 
 
Breyer served at the Buchenwald concentration camp, in 
the Death's Head Battalion guard unit, from February 1943 
to May 1944. At Buchenwald, Breyer accompanied 
prisoners to and from work sites and stood guard with a 
loaded rifle at the perimeter of the camp with orders to 
shoot any prisoner who tried to escape. In May of 1944, 
Breyer was transferred to the Auschwitz death camp, where 
he performed the same duties as he had at Buchenwald. In 
August of 1944, Breyer took a paid leave from his duties at 
Auschwitz and never returned to the camp. 
 
While he denies that he personally tortured or murdered 
prisoners at Buchenwald and Auschwitz, Breyer does not 
now deny that he served in the Death's Head Battalion. In 
May of 1951, however, when Breyer applied for a visa to 
immigrate to the United States under the Displaced Persons 
Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended 
by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950) ("the Act"),3 he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As we explain infra, after a bench trial, the District Court found that 
Breyer's mother was, in fact, an American citizen. Although we vacated 
the District Court's decision on other grounds, we take judicial notice of 
its earlier finding concerning Breyer's mother. Moreover, we note that the 
court's finding is consistent with allegations contained in Breyer's 
pleadings, which we accept as true on review of a dismissal under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
3. In pertinent part, the Displaced Persons Act makes ineligible for 
admission to the United States, 
 
       any person . . . who is or has been a member of or participated in 
       any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or 
       the form of government of the United States, or to any person who 
       advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of 
       race, religion, or national origin. 
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did not disclose that he had served in the Death's Head 
Battalion. Breyer did, however, admit to having been a 
member of the Waffen SS. His visa application initially was 
rejected because of this membership. Subsequently, 
however, the criteria changed so that membership in the 
Waffen SS was no longer a bar to qualifying as a displaced 
person. Thus, on March 28, 1952, the United States 
Displaced Persons' Commission certified Breyer eligible for 
a visa as a displaced person. 
 
Breyer then applied to immigrate to the United States as 
an alien under the Act. He was granted an immigrant visa 
and entered the United States in May 1952. Breyerfiled a 
petition for naturalization in August 1957. On November 7, 
1957, Breyer was naturalized as a United States citizen. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
On April 21, 1992, the United States filed a five-count 
complaint against Johann Breyer in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
under S1451(a) of the INA, as amended, 8 U.S.C.SS 1101 et 
seq. The complaint was filed to revoke Breyer's naturalized 
United States citizenship on the grounds that it was 
illegally procured (Counts I, II, III, IV) or was procured by 
concealment or willful misrepresentation (Count V). 4 The 
government sought to denaturalize Breyer because of his 
service as an armed SS guard at Buchenwald and 
Auschwitz. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 1451(a) states, in pertinent part: 
 
       S 1451. Revocation of naturalization 
 
       (a) Concealment of material evidence; refusal to testify 
       It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the 
respective 
       districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute 
       proceedings in any district court of the United States . . . for 
the 
       purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such 
       person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of 
naturalization 
       on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization 
were 
       illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material 
fact 
       or by willful misrepresentation. . . . 
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Breyer conceded that he was ineligible for displaced 
person's status as a result of his war time activities. 
Nevertheless, he contended that he could not be 
denaturalized because, when he entered this country in 
1952, he did so lawfully, as a United States citizen. Breyer 
asserted that he derived citizenship at birth through his 
mother who, he claimed, was born in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
 
On October 30, 1992, Breyer filed an Application for 
Certificate of Citizenship with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). In his application, Breyer 
claimed citizenship through his mother, pursuant to 
S 1452(a) of the INA. Soon thereafter, in the District Court 
action, the government filed a motion for summary 
judgment, seeking Breyer's denaturalization. 
 
On July 7, 1993, the District Court granted partial 
summary judgment in the government's favor, 
denaturalizing Breyer. At the same time, the District Court 
considered Breyer's claim of citizenship through his mother 
under the equal protection clause and found thatS 1993 
was unconstitutional as applied to Breyer because, at the 
time of Breyer's birth, it conferred citizenship to foreign 
born offspring of American fathers but not to those of 
American mothers. The District Court abstained from 
declaring Breyer a United States citizen, however, until 
after the trial on the issue of Breyer's citizenship through 
his mother. United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993) (Breyer I ). 
 
The District Court held a four day bench trial to 
determine the birth place of Breyer's mother and found that 
she had, indeed, been born in the United States. The court 
held that the remedy for the unconstitutionality ofS 1993, 
as applied to Breyer, was to include mothers under the 
statute retroactively. Nevertheless, the District Court 
abstained from declaring Breyer a citizen because he had 
not exhausted his administrative remedies. His Application 
for Certificate of Citizenship was pending before the INS. 
The District Court then canceled Breyer's certificate of 
naturalization. The court concluded, however, that if Breyer 
were ultimately declared a citizen by birth, his certificate of 
naturalization would be an extraneous document and its 
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revocation would have no effect on his standing as a United 
States citizen. United States v. Breyer, 841 F. Supp. 679, 
686 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Breyer II ). 
 
On December 29, 1993, Breyer filed a motion with the 
District Court for relief from the judgment and a motion to 
alter or amend the judgment, both of which were denied. 
Breyer appealed the denial. On appeal, we affirmed, inter 
alia, the District Court's cancellation of Breyer's certificate 
of naturalization, based on our finding that his war time 
activities disqualified him from being considered a 
"displaced person." United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 
890-91 (3d Cir. 1994) (Breyer III). We also concluded that 
the District Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by 
considering Breyer's derivative citizenship claim. We found 
that the court should have limited its review to the question 
of whether Breyer's naturalization certificate had been 
improperly obtained. Id. at 892. 
 
Subsequently, the INS denied Breyer's Application for 
Certificate of Citizenship. He appealed the denial to the 
Administrative Appeals Unit ("AAU") of the INS, which 
upheld the INS's initial decision. Breyer appealed the AAU's 
decision, and on December 30, 1996, the AAU issued a 
final denial of Breyer's request for citizenship. 
 
On January 22, 1997, the INS and the Office of Special 
Investigations ("OSI") of the United States Department of 
Justice instituted deportation proceedings against Breyer. 
Breyer was found deportable by an immigration judge on 
December 15, 1997. 
 
On October 21, 1997, Breyer filed a Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, requesting review of the AAU's 
denial of his application for citizenship. In the petition, 
Breyer claimed that he was entitled to citizenship, based on 
his mother's status as a citizen of the United States. The 
petition was amended on December 15, 1997, to include 
claims, inter alia, that the OSI had intentionally misled the 
District Court during prior proceedings regarding alleged 
material misrepresentations made by Breyer in his 
naturalization application and that the decision of Breyer's 
former counsel not to contest the OSI's summary judgment 
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motion was not authorized by Breyer. In a second motion to 
amend, filed on April 14, 1998, Breyer requested leave to 
add other defendants and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1983 and 1985. These claims alleged, inter alia, that 
there had been improper lobbying and delay and that 
S 101(c)(2) was a bill of attainder. The Commissioner of the 
INS moved to dismiss Breyer's petition for failure to state a 
claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 
Commissioner also opposed Breyer's motion to amend his 
petition a second time. 
 
On August 27, 1998, the District Court granted the 
Commissioner's motion to dismiss Breyer's petition. Breyer 
v. Meissner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Breyer IV). 
On August 28, the District Court denied Breyer's second 
motion to amend his petition. Breyer v. Meissner , 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 540 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Breyer V). We will consider 
both orders on this appeal. 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction over this action pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The District Court exercised 
jurisdiction by virtue of 8 U.S.C. S 1503(a) and 28 U.S.C. 
S 2201. Our review of the District Court's dismissal of 
Breyer's Petition for Declaratory Judgment and granting of 
the government's motion to dismiss Breyer's Petition is 
plenary. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 
1997). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we allow the non- 
movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from 
the allegations contained in the complaint, and we accept 
these allegations as true. Id. at 684. However, we are not 
required to accept legal conclusions alleged or inferred in 
the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d 
Cir. 1993). We review the District Court's denial of Breyer's 
motion to amend his Petition a second time under an abuse 
of discretion standard. In Re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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IV. Discussion 
 
A. Statutory Framework 
 
1. Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 1874  
 
In 1925, when Johann Breyer was born, S 1993 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1874 governed the grant of citizenship 
to children born to American citizens outside the United 
States. The section contained a gender-based distinction. It 
granted United States citizenship to the foreign-born 
children of American fathers but denied the same to the 
children of American mothers: 
 
       All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the 
       limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose 
       fathers were or may be at the time of their birth 
       citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the 
       United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not 
       descend to children whose fathers never resided in the 
       United States. 
 
This distinction was abandoned in 1934. In that year, 
Congress amended S 1993 to make it gender neutral. As 
amended, the statute extended citizenship to "[a]ny child 
hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
United States, whose father or mother or both at the time 
of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States." 
R.S. 1993, as amended by Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 
S 1, 48 Stat. 797 (1934).5 
 
Because Congress chose not to make the 1934 
amendment retroactive, the previous version of S 1993 
continued to govern the citizenship status of persons born 
before 1934. As a result, all children born abroad in 1934 
or later to an American mother or father were entitled to 
American citizenship at birth; by contrast, children born 
abroad before 1934 were entitled to citizenship only if their 
fathers were American. Thus, Breyer did not benefit from 
the 1934 amendment to S 1993. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. S 1993 was subsequently repealed and replaced. Derivative citizenship 
is now governed by provisions found at S 301 of INA, 8 U.S.C. S 1401. 
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2. INTCA  
 
In 1994, Congress made the 1934 amendment to S 1993 
retroactive for those born before 1934 by passing INTCA. 
Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305, 4306 (1994). 
Specifically, S 101(c)(1) of INTCA conferred citizenship at 
birth to all persons born before noon (Eastern Standard 
Time), May 24, 1934, to an American mother or father. Id. 
at 4306. 
 
The amendment contained an exception, however. This 
exception, contained in S 101(c)(2), states that the 
retroactive application of the amendment "shall not confer 
citizenship on, or affect the validity of any denaturalization, 
deportation, or exclusion action against, any person who 
. . . was excluded from, or who would not have been eligible 
for admission to, the United States under the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948 . . .." Id. at 4306. 
 
B. Application of The Statutes to Breyer 
 
Breyer challenges the constitutionality of S 1993 because 
it denied him citizenship at birth by way of his mother, 
while it would confer citizenship upon a similarly situated 
child if the child's father was American. He challenges the 
constitutionality of S 101(c)(2) of INTCA because, like 
S 1993, it denies him citizenship through his mother, 
although he could not have known when he committed his 
war time activities that they would be expatriating. He 
argues that S 101(c)(2) should not apply to him and that, 
like the children, born before 1934, of American fathers, he 
is entitled to citizenship pursuant to S 101(c)(1). 
 
By contrast, the government argues that this case does 
not concern gender discrimination within the context of 
citizenship rights but rather Congress's powers to regulate 
immigration and naturalization. The government argues 
that S 1993 does not apply to Breyer because he was 
properly disqualified from citizenship under the Displaced 
Persons Act and thus, under S 101(c)(2), because of his war 
time activities. The government defends the 
constitutionality of S 101(c)(2) by arguing that the statute 
protects two legitimate and important governmental 
objectives: it eliminates the gender distinction formerly 
contained in S 1993 by ensuring the equal treatment of all 
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foreign-born children who have committed expatriating 
acts, and it protects national security by ensuring the 
integrity of American citizenship. 
 
The District Court's dismissal of the declaratory 
judgment action was based only on S 101(c)(2). First, it 
determined that Breyer was ineligible for entry into this 
country as a displaced person and that his improper 
attainment of a certificate of naturalized citizenship made 
S 101(c)(2) of INTCA applicable to this case. Although the 
court noted that it was considering Breyer's mother's 
rights, Breyer IV, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 531 n.7, it did not 
review the statute as to how it affected the mother. Second, 
the District Court concluded that Congress's regulation of 
immigration and naturalization, including its passage of 
S 101(c)(2), was entitled to great deference. Id. at 532. Thus, 
in the immigration context, the court analyzed S 101(c)(2) 
under the functional equivalent of the rational relation 
standard of review applied in equal protection cases that do 
not involve suspect classes. This test requires a"facially 
legitimate and bona fide" rationale for S 101(c)(2). Id. at 533 
(citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)).6 Under this 
standard, the District Court found that the statute 
advanced the remedial goal of protecting national security 
and of ensuring equal treatment to foreign-born children of 
American women, including those children who have 
committed expatriating acts or who are ineligible for entry 
into the United States. Id. at 534-37. 
 
The District Court then dismissed Breyer's claim that 
retroactive application of S 101(c)(2) violated due process on 
the same basis as its equal protection analysis. Moreover, 
the court concluded that Breyer had no protected interest 
in citizenship that implicated the right to due process. Id. 
at 538. The District Court concluded in a footnote that 
Breyer's claim to citizenship from birth was mooted by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" test established in 
Fiallo, 
430 U.S. at 794, an immigration case, has been found analytically 
equivalent to the rational basis test normally applied in equal protection 
cases in which no suspect class is involved. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 
801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995); Azizi v. Thornburgh , 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
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S 101(c)(2). Id. at 538 n.12. The District Court also 
determined that S 101(c)(2) was not a bill of attainder. Id. at 
540. 
 
 1. Equal Protection Analysis 
 
We find, however, that the District Court's analysis 
inadequately addressed the issues presented in this case. 
This case involves a conflict with regard to the transmission 
of citizenship both to the parent and to the child. For that 
reason, to the extent that a parent's right to equal 
protection was violated by S 1993, we cannot ignore that 
statutory provision and thereby limit our analysis to 
S 101(c)(2). The District Court erred when it found S 1993 
inapplicable to the facts of this case and concluded that 
Breyer's claim posed a challenge only to S 101(c)(2). 
Because Breyer is making his claim by an assertion of his 
mother's rights under S 1993, both S 1993 of INA and 
S 101(c)(2) of INTCA are applicable. We must begin our 
analysis at the time when the mother's right that Breyer is 
asserting was implicated -- i.e., in 1925 when Johann 
Breyer was born. 
 
       a. Section 1993 
 
Our first consideration under S 1993 is that of standing: 
Is Johann Breyer entitled to assert his mother's equal 
protection rights pursuant to the doctrine of third party 
standing? This doctrine was most recently explicated in 
Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998). In Campbell, 
the Supreme Court held that a white criminal defendant 
had standing to raise equal protection and due process 
objections to discrimination against blacks in the selection 
of grand jurors where this bias was alleged to have infected 
the state's process of prosecuting and convicting him. Id. at 
395-403. In reaching this decision, the Court reiterated 
that one who wishes to assert a third party's rights must 
demonstrate "injury in fact," a close relationship to the 
third party, and a hindrance to the third party asserting its 
own rights. Id. at 397 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 
411 (1991)). 
 
Breyer meets these prerequisites for asserting his 
mother's equal protection rights: his own alleged 
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deprivation of citizenship as a result of discrimination 
against his mother constitutes injury-in-fact, the closeness 
of his relationship to his mother is obvious, and his 
mother's death most definitely constitutes a hindrance to 
her assertion of her own rights. Accord Wauchope v. United 
States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting government's claim that foreign-born offspring of 
deceased American mothers did not have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of R.S. S 1993); Aguayo v. 
Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 484 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (same); 
Elias v. United States Dep't of State, 721 F. Supp. 243, 246- 
47 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (same). 
 
Our next consideration is the standard of scrutiny we will 
apply to Breyer's assertion of his mother's rights. The 
application of S 1993 to Breyer's mother concerns her right 
to equal protection under the laws. Because S 1993 created 
a gender classification with respect to Breyer's mother's 
ability to pass her citizenship to her foreign-born child at 
his birth, the section is subject to heightened scrutiny. 
Thus, this action is distinguishable from cases in which 
courts have considered the equal protection rights of 
naturalized persons themselves and found heightened 
scrutiny inapplicable. See Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 
1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986). 
 
Likewise, because we consider the rights of Breyer's 
mother, this case is distinguishable from Miller v. Albright, 
523 U.S. 420 (1998), the recent case in which the Supreme 
Court considered S 1409(a) of the INA. Section 1409(a) 
requires that by the age of 18 foreign-born illegitimate 
children of American fathers present formal proof of 
paternity in order to obtain citizenship, while illegitimate 
children born abroad to American mothers obtain that 
citizenship at birth. See 523 U.S. at 426-28. The Miller 
Court did not invalidate S 1409(a), and the lead opinion in 
the case, written by Justice Stevens, considered the statute 
under a rational relation standard of scrutiny. Id. at 441. 
The judgment in Miller was reached by a highly divided 
Court, however, with five justices issuing five separate 
opinions, and three justices dissenting. Thus, the 
precedential value of Miller is unclear, particularly in regard 
to the applicable standard of review for INA statutes that 
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contain gender classifications. See Rappa v. New Castle 
County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1057-61 (3d Cir. 1994) (observing 
that when Supreme Court decision is plurality, withfive 
separate opinions issued by those agreeing as to judgment, 
it is difficult to ascertain what is "law of land" and guiding 
principles) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977)). 
 
Even though we do not find clear guidance from the 
Court in Miller, we do find three lines of thought that are 
relevant to our decision to apply heightened scrutiny to 
Breyer's claims through his mother under S 1993. First, 
Justice Stevens in the opinion of the Court, which was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the petitioner's 
grounds for finding S 1409(a) unconstitutional. He rejected 
the gender-based rationale because "the conclusion that 
petitioner is not a citizen rests on several coinciding factors, 
not just the gender of her citizen parent." 523 U.S. at 442. 
As he stated further, "[I]t is not merely the sex of the citizen 
parent that determines whether the child is a citizen under 
the terms of the statute; rather, it is an event creating a 
legal relationship between parent and child--the birth itself 
for citizen mothers, but post-birth conduct for citizen 
fathers and their offspring." Id. at 443. 
 
We can distinguish S 1993 from S 1409(a), however, 
because the offspring seeking citizenship underS 1993 are 
not illegitimate. For that reason, there is no further 
parental acknowledgment required of the male or of the 
female parent beyond the fact of the child's birth. 
 
Second, we note that Justice O'Connor in her concurring 
opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, found that the 
petitioner did not have third party standing. The petitioner 
had not demonstrated that her father, who was still living, 
could not assert his rights. Justice O'Connor commented, 
"The statute . . . accords differential treatment to fathers 
and mothers, not to sons and daughters. Thus, although 
petitioner is clearly injured . . ., the discriminatory impact 
of the provision falls on petitioner's father . . . who is no 
longer a party to this suit. Consequently, I do not believe 
that we should consider petitioner's gender discrimination 
claim." Id. at 445-46. In the absence of the father, the 
daughter's challenge to the constitutionality ofS 1409, if 
 
                                13 
  
indeed assertable, triggered only rational basis scrutiny: 
"[Section] 1409 does not draw a distinction based on the 
gender of the child, so petitioner cannot claim that she has 
been injured by gender discrimination." Id . at 451. 
 
Third, we note in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, that Justice 
Breyer found that the petitioner did have standing to assert 
her father's rights. Id. at 473. He concluded that Miller 
involved citizenship rights, id. at 476-77, the "most 
precious right," id. at 477 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza- 
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963)), rather than alienage. 
Based on his determination that the case involved a gender 
classification within the context of citizenship, Justice 
Breyer applied a heightened level of scrutiny to the gender- 
based classification at issue in S 1409(a). 523 U.S. at 477- 
78. Applying this standard, Justice Breyer foundS 1409(a) 
unconstitutional: "If we apply undiluted equal protection 
standards, we must hold the . . . statut[e] at issue 
unconstitutional." Id. at 481. 
 
Because the case before us also involves a third party 
claim derived from the rights of the American citizen 
mother and because the mother can no longer assert her 
rights herself, we conclude that a heightened level of 
scrutiny should apply here. 
 
Although this case, like Miller, "is about American 
citizenship and its transmission from an American parent 
to [her] child," id. at 476, we address these issues within 
the disturbing context of a child who grew up to become a 
Nazi and who now desires the equal protection of our laws. 
While this context may appear in tension with the ideals of 
American citizenship, in actuality it demonstrates how 
precious the equal application of the laws is to a just 
society. Indeed, Nazi persecution of those deemed inferior, 
including those believed to be morally undesirable, was 
accomplished in part through the manipulation and biased 
application of the law.7 Thus, history teaches that we must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND THE FALL OF THE THIRD R 
              EICH 196 (4th 
ed. 1988) (describing how the passage in 1933 of the"Law for Removing 
the Distress of People and Reich" cloaked the rise of Nazi party "in 
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apply the laws even-handedly, at all times, to all people, 
including those whose actions we find to have been 
repugnant. With these considerations in mind, we will 
evaluate S 1993, as applied to Breyer's mother, and through 
her to Johann Breyer, an admitted SS guard, under the 
same heightened standard of scrutiny to which any other 
gender-based classification is subject. See e.g. United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
 
This heightened level of scrutiny requires "[p]arties who 
seek to defend gender-based government action [to] 
demonstrate an `exceedingly persuasive justification' for 
that action." Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (citing J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n. 6 (1994) and 
Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724). An 
exceedingly persuasive justification must be proffered even 
if the statute at issue is designed to remedy past gender- 
based discrimination. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; cf. Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220-22 (1995) 
(requiring strict scrutiny of race-based classifications made 
by federal government, even if they are designed to remedy 
past discrimination). The burden of proving that the 
gender-based classification in question "serves important 
objectives" and that the discriminatory means employed to 
achieve these objectives are "substantially related" to the 
achievement of those objectives "rests entirely on the 
State." Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 
We do not find that the government has offered an 
"exceedingly persuasive justification" in support of the 
gender classification that prevented Breyer's mother from 
conveying American citizenship at the birth of her son. In 
fact, the government has not at all attempted to justify the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
legality"); id. at 200-01 (describing the promulgation of the "Law for the 
Reconstruction of the Third Reich" in 1934 and explaining how it 
"lawfully" allowed the development of a "one-party totalitarian [Nazi] 
State [to be] achieved with scarcely a ripple of opposition or defiance"); 
id. at 263 (describing how the "Law Regulating National Labor" of 1934 
made German workers "industrial serfs," and captains of industry 
"absolute masters"). 
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classification contained in S 1993. Instead, the government 
maintains that this case is not at all about gender 
discrimination in the transmission of citizenship rights but 
about the government's right to deny entry and citizenship 
to Nazis and like individuals. Thus, the government argues 
that Breyer's claim should only be considered under INTCA, 
and in particular under S 101(c)(2). We find, however, that 
this case indisputably concerns gender discrimination 
within the context of the transmission of citizenship rights. 
Because Breyer is asserting his mother's rights, which 
arose in 1925, we must deal with S 1993 before we turn to 
S 101(c)(2), and in doing so we must analyze the impact of 
the discriminatory language of S 1993. 
 
The government has chosen not to present a justification 
for this preliminary step of analyzing the purpose behind 
S 1993. They must for this reason concede thisfirst step. 
There is no support in the case law for surmising a defense 
for the government in gender discrimination cases, where it 
has not offered one. We will not do so here. 
 
In finding that S 1993 unconstitutionally perpetuated 
gender discrimination, we are joined by the Ninth Circuit 
and two district courts, all of which reviewed the statute 
under the much more deferential rational relation standard 
of review. See Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1416 ("The United 
States has not set forth a facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason to justify [S 1993's] unequal treatment of citizen men 
and women."); Aguayo, 865 F. Supp. at 490 (finding that 
S 1993 is unconstitutional under rational relation standard 
because it unlawfully discriminates against those"whose 
only misfortune . . . was to be born of citizen mothers 
instead of citizen fathers); Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 249 ("[W]e 
are obliged to find [S 1993's] differential treatment of men 
and women unconstitutional if the review power explicitly 
articulated by the Fiallo Court is to have any meaning."). 
 
We conclude, therefore, that S 1993 does not survive 
equal protection analysis. It unconstitutionally 
discriminated against Breyer's mother on the basis of 
gender, with the effect of depriving her son, Johann Breyer, 
of citizenship at birth. 
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        b. Section 101(c)(2) 
 
Having determined that Breyer's mother was denied 
equal protection of the laws by S 1993 and that she should 
have been entitled to pass on her U.S. citizenship to her 
son at the time of his birth, we now turn to the effect of the 
1994 amendment to the INA, which added S 101(c)(2). 
Breyer claims that S 101(c)(2) perpetuates the 
discriminatory impact of S 1993 in that it deprives his 
mother of the right to pass on her citizenship to him due to 
wrongdoing on his part in a situation where he could not 
know of the expatriating effect of his wrongdoing. 
 
The government defends the constitutionality of 
S 101(c)(2) by citing two rationales for the statute's 
enactment. It eliminates the gender distinction formerly 
contained in S 1993 by ensuring the equal treatment of all 
foreign-born children who have committed expatriating 
acts, and it protects the national security by ensuring the 
integrity of American citizenship. The remedying of gender 
discrimination is the primary justification offered for 
S 101(c)(2). 
 
The District Court found these reasons bona fide and 
legitimate under the Fiallo standard. Breyer IV, 23 F. Supp. 
2d at 533-37. The court's decision was premised on its 
assumption that Breyer was asserting an equal protection 
claim not as a putative citizen but as an alien who clearly 
is deportable under S 101(c)(2). Id. at 535. The court found 
that "[t]he people affected by INTCA are not citizens who are 
expatriated by 101(c)(2); they are instead aliens who are 
denied naturalization by S 101(c)(2), and the denial of 
naturalization burdens no fundamental right of 
citizenship." Id. Reviewing S 101(c)(2) under the deferential 
Fiallo standard, the court accepted the government's 
justifications for the statute's constitutionality. The District 
Court found S 101(c)(2) a legitimate means of ensuring the 
equal treatment of all foreign-born children of American 
citizens, who have committed expatriating acts, and of 
protecting the national security. Breyer IV, 23 F. Supp. 2d 
at 533--37. 
 
We disagree with the analysis of the District Court. Its 
decision appears to be predicated upon the incorrect 
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assumption that Breyer's challenge to S 101(c)(2) was 
asserted only on his own claim to citizenship, rather than 
on his assertion of his mother's claim to equal protection. 
However, as we stated supra, Breyer asserts his mother's 
equal protection rights as to S 1993. As we explain below, 
we conclude that S 101(c)(2) incorporates the gender 
discrimination of S 1993, as applied to Breyer's mother. For 
that reason, the rights of Breyer's mother, an American 
citizen, underpin Breyer's challenge to S 101(c)(2). 
 
The fundamental problem with S 101(c)(2) as applied to 
Breyer and his mother is that it preserves an anomaly: 
Whereas a child born to an American father is and always 
has been entitled to United States citizenship at birth, a 
particular subset of children born to an American mother 
continue to be excluded from citizenship. Thus, while 
S 101(c)(1) cured the discriminatory effects of S 1993, as 
written in 1925 and amended in 1934, S 101(c)(2) took 
away that cure for a subset of American mothers whose 
foreign-born off-spring have committed certain acts. 
However, it is the conduct of the offspring, not the conduct 
of the American citizen mothers, that determines the 
differentiation. The 1994 amendment does not then 
"completely and irrevocably eradicat[e] the effects" of the 
discrimination against mothers contained in S 1993. See 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) 
(holding that claim is moot only if violation has ceased and 
interim relief or events have "completely and irrevocably 
eradicated the effects" of the violation). 
 
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that 
Congress was focused on the offspring, and not on the 
remedy for S 1993's discrimination to the mothers, when it 
enacted S 101(c)(2). Representative [now Senator] Schumer 
explained that the bill that would become S 101(c)(2) 
remedied the gender discrimination inherent in S 1993 as it 
applied to some American citizen mothers, but intentionally 
did not extend that cure to mothers of certain offspring who 
had committed "expatriating" acts. 
 
       Currently, only a child of an American father born 
       overseas can be naturalized. This provision would 
       extend naturalization to children born of American 
       mothers--ironing out a wrinkle in our immigration law. 
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       However, there are several Nazi expatriation cases 
       pending in the United States that would be jeopardized 
       if Nazi children of American mothers were to be 
       naturalized. Nazis born to American fathers do not 
       have this problem because a recent court case ruled 
       that if an individual was aware of their U.S. citizenship 
       at the time the crimes were committed they can be 
       found guilty of an expatriating crime. Obviously Nazis 
       naturalized retroactively could not have known of their 
       U.S. citizenship during the time their crimes were 
       committed. Proper persecution of these individuals 
       depends on the ability to denaturalize and deport them 
       to stand trial overseas for war crimes. Although this is 
       a strange twist in the law it must be reconciled. H.R. 
       783 would do just that. 
 
Vol. 140, No. 132 Cong. Rec. H9280 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 
1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer); see also id . at H9277 
(recognizing that relevant section of INTCA corrected sex 
discrimination in S 1993, as amended, "while expressly 
prohibit[ing] the conferral of citizenship to anyone who 
assisted in any form of Nazi persecution") (statement of 
Rep. Mazzoli). 
 
These statements demonstrate that Congress 
contemplated that the exception contained in S 101(c)(2) 
would exclude persons like Breyer.8 Congress's decision to 
employ S 101(c)(2) to deny citizenship to Breyer and to 
similarly situated children of American citizen mothers was 
premised on case law that holds that the government must 
prove that a citizen has intended to relinquish citizenship 
in order to demonstrate that that citizen has expatriated 
himself. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980). 
Since S 1993 granted citizenship to the foreign-born 
children of male American citizens during all relevant 
periods, these children may have been aware of their 
American citizenship during the World War II period. See 
United States v. Shiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1190-91 (E.D. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Department of Justice, which prosecuted Breyer's 
denaturalization claim in the trial courts, lobbied for the exception 
contained in S 101(c)(2). See Vol. 139, No. 164 Cong. Rec. S16863 (daily 
ed. Nov. 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
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Pa. 1993), aff'd, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994). The voluntary 
participation in Nazi persecution by those who were aware 
of the expatriating nature of their actions has been found 
inconsistent with an intent to retain United States 
citizenship. See Shiffer, 831 F. Supp. at 1191 (citing 
Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1420 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). Thus, the government can expatriate the 
children of American citizen fathers who knowingly 
committed expatriating acts. 
 
By contrast, since S 1993 discriminated against the 
foreign-born children of American females during all 
relevant periods, these children presumptively would not 
have known that their participation in Nazi persecution 
constituted an act of expatriation. Thus, they may not have 
realized that these actions would forfeit their American 
citizenship, of which they were also unaware at the time. 
Section 101(c)(2) attempts to skirt the requirement that a 
citizen intend, by his actions, to expatriate himself. It does 
so by referring to certain conduct by offspring that can in 
turn lead to denaturalization, deportation, or exclusionary 
proceedings against the offspring, rather than to the 
offspring's act of expatriation itself. This shift in the 
prohibitory language eliminates the intent requirement, 
which the Supreme Court established in Terrazas  for 
citizens, and substitutes for it the test applied to aliens, 
which does not require a showing of intent. 
 
This differentiation, however, leaves the underlying 
discrimination intact. Rather than eradicating all 
discrimination occasioned by S 1993, S 101(c)(2) 
perpetuates it by imposing a different test on the foreign- 
born offspring of American mothers than it does on the 
foreign-born offspring of American fathers. The foreign-born 
children of American fathers will acquire citizenship at 
birth and lose it only by intentionally committed 
expatriating acts. The foreign-born children of American 
citizen mothers will be prevented from obtaining American 
citizenship if they, with or without intent, have committed 
similar expatriating acts. The subjection of American 
women to this additional burden for the transmission of 
citizenship to their foreign-born offspring is in fundamental 
tension with the principle of equal protection. Wefind no 
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legitimate reason for such disparate treatment of American 
citizen mothers that is sufficient to override their guarantee 
to equal protection of the laws. We reach this conclusion 
even though the foreign-born children have committed acts 
that we find morally repugnant. Our focus in this section of 
our analysis is on the mother, not on the offspring. 
Moreover, the fact that S 101(c)(1) of INTCA remedies 
discrimination against some American citizen mothers does 
not cure the defects inherent in S 101(c)(2). 
 
Nor is the dissimilar treatment of American citizen 
mothers, perpetuated by S 101(c)(2), justified as a means of 
protecting national security. The government provides no 
evidence in support of this proposition. The government 
position is directed to the offspring, not to the American 
citizen mothers. Indeed, the cases that the District Court 
cites to support its conclusion that the government's 
national security justification for S 101(c)(2) is rational refer 
only to alienage. For that reason, these cases do not control 
the interests of American citizen mothers or their foreign- 
born children, but only the interests of resident aliens with 
no birth claim to citizenship. See, e.g., Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1950) (upholding 
expulsion of resident aliens for membership in the 
Communist party); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 
1986); Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1030. Consequently, because 
these cases offer us no guidance on how S 101(c)(2) impacts 
the equal protection right of Breyer's American citizen 
mother relative to S 1993, they are inapposite to this action. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the disparate 
treatment of mothers that S 101(c)(2) perpetuates is 
arbitrary and irrational, see Vance v. Bradley , 440 U.S. 93, 
97 (1993). We hold that S 101(c)(2), as applied to Breyer's 
mother and through her to Johann Breyer, violates equal 
protection by perpetuating the gender discrimination 
contained in S 1993, which prevented his mother from 
transmitting citizenship to him at birth. Johann Breyer 
should be entitled to American citizenship relating back to 
the time of his birth. 
 
2. Intent Requirement for Expatriating Acts 
 
This conclusion does not, however, terminate our 
consideration of this difficult case. We have determined that 
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Johann Breyer should have been entitled to American 
citizenship from the date of his birth, but is he still so 
entitled? Even though we conclude that S 101(c)(2) is 
constitutionally invalid, must we ignore Johann Breyer's 
activities during World War II and the impact that the 
decisions he made during that period may have had on his 
present claim to citizenship? 
 
Let us begin our further consideration by reviewing the 
reason for which Congress amended the statute in 1994 in 
the way in which it did. Congress based the exclusionary 
provisions of S 101(c)(2) on denaturalization, deportation or 
exclusion grounds, rather than on the grounds for 
expatriation. The reason for this is that a denaturalization, 
deportation, or exclusion action against an alien can be 
taken without any proof that the alien intended to commit 
the acts that qualify him for the sanction; there is no intent 
requirement. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has 
held that a citizen cannot be expatriated without an intent 
to surrender United States citizenship. See Terrazas, 444 
U.S. at 270. The decision in Terrazas grew from the holding 
in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not take away 
citizenship simply on the basis of certain actions a citizen 
may have taken, without a citizen voluntarily renouncing it 
or giving it up. Arguably, Breyer could not have intended to 
surrender his American citizenship if he did not realize that 
he was entitled to it. Nevertheless, we see an important 
distinction between the facts of cases like Terrazas and 
Afroyim and the situation before us. 
 
Beys Afroyim was born in Poland and naturalized as an 
American citizen when he was a young man. After 34 years 
he went to Israel where he voted in an election for the 
Israeli Knesset. When he went to the American Embassy to 
renew his passport, the Department of State refused to do 
so on the ground that he had lost his American citizenship 
by virtue of S 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which 
provided that a citizen would "lose" his citizenship if he 
voted in a political election in a foreign state. Afroyim 
challenged this decision, and ultimately the Supreme Court 
held that Congress could not deprive him of his citizenship 
unless he voluntarily relinquished it. 
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Laurence Terrazas held American and Mexican 
citizenship from the time of his birth in the United States 
as the son of a Mexican citizen. When he was a student in 
Mexico at the age of 22, he executed an application for a 
certificate of Mexican nationality "expressly renounc[ing] 
United States citizenship, as well as any submission, 
obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially 
to that of the United States of America . . .." 444 U.S. at 
255. He obtained a certificate of Mexican citizenship that 
provided that he had "expressly renounced all rights 
inherent to any other nationality, as well as all submission, 
obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially 
to those which have recognized him as that national." Id. 
Terrazas later brought suit against the Secretary of State 
for a declaration of his U.S. nationality. The government 
argued that Terrazas had knowingly sworn allegiance to 
Mexico and renounced his allegiance to the United States. 
The Supreme Court held that when a statutory expatriating 
action is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, it is 
constitutional to presume the action to have been voluntary 
"until and unless proved otherwise by the actor." Id. at 270. 
If the actor succeeds in proving the act was not voluntary, 
he will not be expatriated. If he fails, the court must 
determine whether the expatriating act was performed with 
an intent to relinquish citizenship. Id. Terrazas's case was 
remanded for the District Court to make furtherfindings on 
voluntariness. 
 
The acts committed by Johann Breyer are very different 
from those of Afroyim and Terrazas. During World War II, 
when Germany was at war with the United States, Breyer 
joined first the Waffen SS and then the Death's Head 
Battalion. The Waffen SS was a voluntary organization.9 
The Death's Head units were composed of volunteers from 
other SS units.10 Apparently, Breyer may have made a 
knowing and voluntary decision to join each of these 
groups. Some historians assert that such a commitment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Apparently until approximately mid-1942, no one was compelled to 
join any part of the SS organization. Enlistment was genuinely 
voluntary. See HELMUT KRAUSNICK ET AL., ANATOMY OF THE SS STATE 387 
(1965). 
 
10. Id. at 570. 
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was knowing and voluntary. One commentator has 
described the situation as follows: 
 
       So anyone who joined the SS later than 1934 must 
       have known what he was doing. Naturally the extent to 
       which a man realized the significance of his action 
       depended in some degree upon his educational level 
       and political background; a yokel joining a Totenkopf 
       Sturmbann in 1937 is not to be equated with a barrister 
       entering the SD at the same period. Nobody joining the 
       SS could of course know that he would later be ordered 
       to take part in organized mass murder; nevertheless 
       anyone must have been aware that he was joining an 
       organization where he would have to carry out illegal 
       orders. By the mere fact of joining he was accepting 
       certain principles and practices which could not but 
       lead on occasions to culpable action. No one of course 
       who lives under a totalitarian system can be sure that 
       he will not one day be forced into a tragic situation for 
       which he may be held guilty. Entry into the SS, 
       however, implied that a man accepted this risk with his 
       eyes open. The nearest to an exception was the man 
       who joined the SS-Verfugungstruppe; it was, of course, 
       part of the praetorian guard but nevertheless its 
       training was clearly exclusively military and it had 
       nothing to do with the political duties of the Allgemeine 
       SS, with political police matters or with concentration 
       camps. Everybody, however, who joined the SS was 
       forsaking the sphere in which obligations were simply 
       those of the normal loyal citizen and entering that in 
       which the ideological order was paramount. By the 
       mere fact of joining the SS every man was giving his 
       ideological assent and declaring himself ready to do 
       more than his duty.11 
 
The above description of the knowing commitment made 
by a member of the Death's Head Battalion, during a period 
when Germany was at war with the United States, 
demonstrates a loyalty to the policies of Nazi Germany that 
is wholly inconsistent with American citizenship. Although 
when he took his oath of allegiance first to the Waffen SS 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Id. at 390. 
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and then to the Death's Head Battalion, Johann Breyer was 
not aware of his right to American citizenship, one could 
conclude that he voluntarily made a commitment that, had 
he known of this right, clearly would have repudiated it. 
Afroyim and Terrazas do not deal with such a situation 
where a knowing commitment to a foreign nation at war 
with the United States is accompanied by voluntary acts 
that plainly disclaim any allegiance to the United States 
and the political principles for which it stands. We conclude 
that Johann Breyer may have made such a disclaimer of 
allegiance to the United States by a voluntary enlistment in 
the Waffen SS and then again in the Death's Head 
Battalion. 
 
Under Terrazas, Breyer has the burden of proving that 
his expatriating acts were not voluntary.12 If these acts were 
voluntary, however, the court must determine whether they 
were performed with an intent to relinquish citizenship. We 
conclude that a voluntary oath of allegiance to a nation at 
war with the United States and to an organization of that 
warring nation that is committed to policies incompatible 
with the principles of American democracy and the rights of 
citizens protected by the American constitution-- an 
organization such as the Death's Head Battalion-- is an 
unequivocal renunciation of American citizenship whether 
or not the putative citizen is then aware that he has a right 
to American citizenship. 
 
We will, therefore, remand this case to the District Court 
to make further findings concerning the circumstances 
under which Breyer joined the Waffen SS and the Death's 
Head Battalion to determine if his actions constitute a 
voluntary and unequivocal renunciation of any possible 
allegiance to the United States of America, a renunciation 
made in a time of war against the United States that 
demonstrated an allegiance to Nazi Germany and a 
repudiation of any loyalty -- citizen or not -- to the United 
States. Cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958) 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting and stating that some actions 
"may be so inconsistent with the retention of citizenship as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Entering the armed forces of a foreign state or serving in its 
government is an expatriating act. See 8 U.S.C. S 1481(a)(4) and (5). 
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to result in loss of that status."). On remand, the District 
Court must determine whether Breyer's acts constitute 
such a renunciation. 
 
Because of our conclusion on the unconstitutionality of 
S 101(c)(2), we do not need to consider Breyer's due process 
and bill or attainder arguments. Concerning Breyer's 
contention that he should have had the right to amend his 
complaint for a second time, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) allows a 
party to amend his complaint once as a matter of right. 
Subsequent amendments are at the discretion of the court; 
courts may deny leave to amend on grounds such as undue 
delay, dilatory motive, bad faith, prejudice, and futility. In 
Re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1434. 
Courts are advised to grant leave to amend if "justice so 
requires." Id. 
 
Breyer appeals the District Court's failure to grant him 
leave to amend his Petition a second time, after he 
amended it once as a matter of right. The District Court's 
refusal to grant Breyer leave to amend a second time was 
based on its determinations that the amendments were 
predicated upon a dilatory motive, and in any event, would 
be futile. The District Court's reasoning regarding Breyer's 
request to amend is set forth in a lengthy and thoughtful 
memorandum. 
 
After reviewing the record in this case and the court's 
Memorandum and Order denying the motion to amend, we 
find no cause to disturb the District Court's conclusions. 
Therefore, we find that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to allow Breyer to amend his Petition a 
second time. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Johann 
Breyer was improperly denied citizenship at birth and 
reverse the District Court's Order of August 27, 1998. We 
affirm the Order of August 28, 1998, denying Breyer leave 
to amend his complaint. We remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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